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North Caucasus: Negative Trends

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A large, stylized globe graphic in the bottom half of the cover, showing the continents of Europe and Asia in a light tan color against a darker tan background. The globe is overlaid with a grid of latitude and longitude lines.

North Caucasus: Negative Trends

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Key Findings

- Shortfalls in financial subsidies to North Caucasus republics will intensify and widen the cycle of violence which will affect the South Caucasus.
- A widened cycle of violence would be harmful to Western interests in Georgia and Azerbaijan.
- Reduced scale of subsidies contrasts sharply with the vast sums being spent by Russia on 2014 Olympics and financial aid to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and will intensify discontent.
- Need for radical political reform: continuation of forceful measures alone will not improve the situation. Need for republics to elect their own leaders.
- Greater investment in education, technical training, job creation and health care are needed for the young and the population in general.
- Effective intelligence is needed to stop the flow of illegal funds into the North Caucasus.
- Operations against illegal bandit formations must be conducted within the law: punishment of offenders must be effected openly through the courts.

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North Caucasus: Negative Trends

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The Southern Federal District



Introduction

“Many perceived that the ending of the counter-terrorist operation (KTO) in Chechnya meant the conclusion of the war against the bandit underground in the North Caucasus”.¹ However, as recent events have shown, the bandit underground is still alive in Chechnya and increasingly active throughout the North Caucasus. The purpose of this paper is to enlarge upon certain negative, underlying trends which are gathering momentum as a result of an increasing cycle of violence.

Several negative trends spring to mind. This paper concentrates on the widening cycle of violence and the departure of ethnic Russians to more peaceful regions, which impacts on the economies of the eastern republics in the North Caucasus through the loss of skilled workers. There are indications of an upsurge in Cossack militancy in Krasnodar and Stavropol’ *Kraya*. Not unconnected to this, there is growing concern amongst the smaller republics, such as Ingushetia, about the possible creation of an enlarged *oblast’* based on Rostov-on-Don which would come under Cossack control. This would make it more difficult for the indigenous Muslim peoples to preserve their own way of life, customs and languages.

The Context

It is advantageous to focus on the long term effects of Russian absorption, which started in earnest in the 19th Century and continued throughout the period of Communist governance. Four themes stand out.

Box 1 – North Caucasus – Brief Historical Perspective

- Cossack territorial occupation in the North Caucasus was aided by the establishment of *stanitsy* as part of the Caucasus Fortified Lines, in parallel with the forceful resettlement of the indigenous Muslim population, which in turn weakened the power of Chechen and Ingush *teipy*.
- Tsarist land policy favoured Cossacks to the detriment of the indigenous Muslim mountain peoples. Shortage of arable land added to the latter’s plight. The hounding out of some 500,000 people in the second half of the 19th Century was compounded by a numerically similar influx of Russians and Ukrainians.
- In the 20th century, Communist governance brought new administrative-territorial structures based on nationality.
- Repression, religious persecution and mass deportation of Muslims were to follow during the Great Patriotic War. On their return in 1957 they became the victims of bureaucratic prejudice and inertia, leaving a legacy of disputes, sources of social aggravation and conflict which remain today.

It should also be remembered that whilst the North and South Caucasus in the Russian mind are considered as part of a whole security complex,² one must also be aware of the close connection that the North Caucasus mountainous areas have with the hinterland to the north which contain the *kraya* of Krasnodar and Stavropol’ together with the related *oblasts* of the major cities of Southern Russia, namely Rostov-on-Don, Astrakhan and Volgograd. Traditionally, the southern cities of Rostov-on-Don, Volgograd and Astrakhan have beckoned peoples seeking work from the North Caucasus or (in the case of the last two cities) from

Central Asia and beyond. Moreover, the wider area contained within the Southern Federal District (YuFO) can be regarded as a transit zone subject to influences emanating from the Caucasus massif, Central Asia and from states that border the Caspian Sea.

Aleksey Malashenko's paper *Kavkaz, Kotoryy my Teryayem*,³ published in August 2009, provides some firm guidelines as to how to gain an understanding of the present complicated situation in the North Caucasus in the toxic aftermath of the two Russo-Chechen wars in recent times. Malashenko reminds the reader that the North Caucasus is not a single uniform entity. The traditions of its peoples are diverse, their routes to Russia and their life within Russia are by no means similar. Therefore, in talking about general tendencies in the region it is still necessary to remember the essential characteristics that are peculiar to each republic and even down to local segments, such as the administrative level of *rayony* and even *auls*. The Caucasus mosaic is varied. To assume that certain events which occur in the lower reaches of the River Sunzha will automatically have identical characteristics to those in the upper reaches of the river is risky.⁴

In general terms the North Caucasus can be divided into two sub-regions: the 'East' which includes Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia, and the 'West' consisting of the remaining republics. Historically, this was the pattern for most of the Long Caucasian War in the 19th century and the majority of Imam Shamil's military campaigns. Kabardino-Balkaria is situated geographically in the middle of the North Caucasus: some consider it to be 'western', others 'eastern' and some consider it to be somewhat independent as a central sub-region.⁵

The third point Malashenko makes concerns some of the principles which divide the North Caucasus into separate fragments. One of them is the degree of devotion to Islam, where the 'East' is regarded as having a far greater degree of Islamisation than the 'West'. Whilst the 'East' is regarded as being unstable, the 'West' is also subject to sporadic outbursts. Chechnya is "*not the champion of instability*". Dagestan is significantly more dangerous.⁶ An intermediate position of instability is accorded to Kabardino-Balkaria following the destructive events and significant loss of life which took place in the capital, Nal'chik, in October 2005 when 97 gunmen (*boyeviki*), 35 members of the law enforcement organs and 14 local inhabitants were killed.⁷ Malashenko makes the point that the position has much changed since October 2005. However, analysts still continue to connect Kabardino-Balkaria with the stormy Caucasus 'East'.⁸ But he is clear on the general reasons for the continuous conflict situation:

*Not a little has been said about the general reasons concerning conflict in the North Caucasus. It is the dire economic position, the growth of material inequality, unemployment, rivalry between group interests and ethnic clans, the gulf between government elites and society, the 'exclusive' marks of corruption, religious extremism, border problems between separate republics and of republics internally. All these reasons are interlinked and to simply construct a hierarchy is impossible. There is not a single thread with which it would be possible to unravel the whole ball.*⁹

Trend One - Cycle of Violence

Under the iron fist of Ramzan Kadyrov, Groznyy has appeared quiet for some considerable time. True, a proportion of young Chechen men were still going to the mountainous south and joining the *boyeviki*. However, that illusion of peace and security in the Chechen capital was shattered when on 15 May 2009 an assassin blew up a vehicle loaded with explosives close to the Interior Ministry (MVD) building in Groznyy. As a result two policemen were killed and three were wounded. Several local people suffered injury.¹⁰

The abduction of Nataliya Estemirova, an activist in the Grozny section of "Memorial" Human Rights Centre on 15 July 2009 in Grozny and the subsequent discovery of her body in Ingushetia caused profound shock not only in Russia but also throughout the world.¹¹ On 11 August 2009 the bodies of the leader of a children's charity Zarema Sadulayeva and her husband Alik Dzhabrailov were found in the Zavodskiy district of Grozny.¹² Moreover, during the 120 day period from the cessation of the KTO in Chechnya from 16 April to 15 August 2009, no less than 125 people lost their lives.¹³

In a number of respects one can understand Kadyrov's impatience in attempting to develop the economy of Chechnya and increase the revenue into Grozny's coffers. The abolition or suspension of the KTO in Chechnya would enable the Chechen government to establish effective customs posts, and remove or reduce the number of federal troops and law enforcement organs in the republic. Public order and law enforcement would then solely be in the hands of the Chechen president. Officially federal troops and federal law enforcement agencies and organs are accountable to Moscow for their behaviour. Chechen law enforcers are very much under the tight personal control of President Kadyrov: there have been many unexplained assassinations, mysterious deaths, disappearances without trace and arson attacks on houses belonging to relatives of suspected *boyeviki*.

In Dagestan, there has been a series of attempts on the lives of high ranking members of the power structures, government officials and religious leaders. The deputy mufti of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Dagestan, Akhmed Tagayev, one of the main opponents of Islamic extremism, was killed. Immediately following the death of Tagayev, the deputy chief of staff of the North Caucasus regional command of Federal Internal Troops Major General Valeriy Lipinskiy received serious wounds and died in hospital. On 5 June 2009 the minister for internal affairs of Dagestan Lieutenant General Adil'gerey Magomedtagirov was shot and killed whilst attending the wedding of the daughter of one of his subordinates.¹⁴ Every single day without exception the media report details of several incidents of lawlessness, murder of government officials or clashes between law enforcement agencies and insurgents ranging from Makhachkala, Buynaksk and south to the equally troubled area around Derbent.

In Ingushetia during June 2009, victims included the deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Court A Gazgireyev, and former head of the local MVD and an employee of the Ingush government Bashir Aushev.¹⁵ The most serious event was the attempted assassination of the Ingush President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov on 22 June. The assassination attempt was followed on 17 August by a terrorist act in Nazran' which resulted in the death of 14 people and 56 wounded.¹⁶ Over the first half of 2009 in Ingushetia alone there were 58 armed attacks, resulting in casualties in the law enforcement organs amounting to 37 wounded and 79 killed.¹⁷

For the investigation of these and other high-profile terrorist crimes in the North Caucasus the best investigators were dispatched from Moscow and St Petersburg. The head of the Investigative Committee under the procurator of Russia, Aleksandr Bastrykin, considered that in the law enforcement organs of Ingushetia, Dagestan and Chechnya it was likely there were traitors who were able to supply the *boyeviki* with information. Therefore the power departments would now have to carry out more thorough checks on employees.¹⁸ This, of course is by no means a new problem. It will be remembered that *Izvestiya* published six articles by Vadim Rechkalov in December 2004 concerning some of the problems faced by the Federal Security Service and other federal law enforcement organs in Chechnya and other North Caucasus republics.¹⁹ Law enforcement organs still have to employ local civil labour.

Bastrykin said that the financing of bandit formations from abroad had increased by many times, as illustrated by the recent discovery of a notebook recording details and dates with payment figures for various types of crime.

Boyeviki now actively attract the young unemployed.²⁰ The money which is paid for the murder of one man provides a chance to exist comfortably for some time. Criminals now move about the North Caucasus freely of their own accord. They are not restricted to one republic, as formerly, but they are able to move out of Dagestan to Ingushetia, from Ingushetia to Kabardino-Balkaria.²¹

At the end of May 2009 a joint special operation by Chechen and Ingush power structures took place in the forest along their joint border. Within the month of the operation some 30 *boyeviki* were killed, a large number of caches were uncovered and forest bases were destroyed. The power structures lost 19 men and 26 wounded.²²

The violence and skirmishes are reminiscent of the worst period of confrontation between the federal authorities and local separatists. Now, armed clashes, shootings, and acts of terror happen daily. This is explained not only by the increasing inflow of money to the extremists, but also by the actions of the power structures themselves, in the first place by the Kadyrov militia. The aggressive style of counter-terrorist operations forces bandits to abandon underground shelters, come out into the open and fight. After this a comprehensive cordon and search operation is initiated, but to be really effective the incoming flow of money needs to be intercepted and halted.²³

The situation in the Caucasus has deteriorated markedly since the publication of a devastating report just over four years ago by Dmitriy Kozak, when he was President Putin's Personal Representative to the YuFO. (He is now deputy leader of the Russian government.) The report unambiguously foretold the dangers:

There is a sharp growth of radicalism and extremism, a widening gap between constitutional democratic principles and the processes taking place in reality. In the end it could lead to the appearance of a macro-region of social, political and economic instability which will include all the Caucasus republics and part of Stavropol' kray.²⁴

A whole macro-region of social, political and economic instability has certainly arrived. The 'bandit underground' has demonstrated that not only can it switch, synchronise and coordinate its anti-Russian and anti-republic activities between Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and to other locations in the North Caucasus, but it is also able to concentrate its activities on the tiny republic of Ingushetia with devastating effect. Nevertheless, the upsurge in violence against the government in Ingushetia is surely misplaced. President Yunus-Bek Yevkurov since his appointment in November 2008 made a distinct effort to reopen the channels between government and society.²⁵ Moreover, on his return to office after hospitalisation in Moscow, Yevkurov suspended the KTO regime in Ingushetia and stated that he would not rescind his promise to pardon *boyeviki* who surrendered to the authorities. In many ways Yevkurov's approach is very much that followed by the first Ingush president. Ruslan Aushev believed that society must vote for its leader, not accepting one imposed from outside the republic.

Trend 2 - Outflow of Ethnic Russians

In an interview with *Novyye Izvestiya*²⁶ on 29 July 2008 Mavlit Bazhayev, President of the Association of Chechen Social and Cultural Institutions, propounded his vision for the long-term development of the North Caucasus republics. He believed that the main goal should be the complete integration of the North Caucasus into the overall Russian social-economic space. If this strategic task was not resolved, then the basis for future disturbances and new crises would take root.²⁷

In Bazhayev's opinion one of the main negative tendencies which threatened the vital interests of the Russian Federation was the active outflow of Russian speaking people from the North Caucasus. The process had attained such a scale that it threatened the security of the country: in the first place this affected Chechnya and Ingushetia. In 1989, the Population

Census for the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, showed that there were 1,275,000 people in the autonomous republic.²⁸ According to Bazhayev, on 1 January 2008 the figures from Rosstat showed the Vaynakh population in Chechnya was 1,209,000 people and a further 499,000 lived in neighbouring Ingushetia.²⁹

Bazhayev believed that in the republics of the North Caucasus today, mono-ethnic, mono-cultural societies had already been established. Local values prevailed and policies were carried out by local elites, so the Centre was losing the levers of control. A real threat existed, he believed, of a yawning gap between the North Caucasus and the social-political and cultural space of the Russian Federation.³⁰

The ethnic shape and composition of the region has changed significantly. In 1989 the Vaynakh peoples (Chechen and Ingush) made up 57% of the Checheno-Ingush Republic's population. The remaining 43% were Russian speaking inhabitants: Russians, Ukrainians, and Armenians. The majority of the Russian speaking population lived in the large towns of Groznyy, Argun, and Gudermes, and also in compact communities along the Terek left bank, for instance in Naurskiy and Shelkovskiy *rayony*. According to the 2002 Population Census, Chechens amounted to more than 93% of the Chechen Republic's population. In neighbouring Ingushetia the titular population numbered more than 77%.³¹

According to the YuFO administration, over the last decade more than 300,000 Russian speaking people had left Chechnya.³² In the neighbouring republic of Ingushetia the situation was not so critical, but there was also a general tendency for Russian speaking people to leave.³³ doubtless the figures for Ingushetia could also show a significant increase over the last 12 months.

After two bitter wars, 14 years of conflict in all, it is not surprising that ethnic Russians are moving away from the front-line Muslim republics and seeking safer regions further north.

Table 1 – North Caucasus – Ethnic Russian Population

Republic or <i>Kray</i>	1939 ³⁴ Census	1959 Census	1979 Census	1989 Census	1998 ³⁵	2002 ³⁶ Census	2005 ³⁷
Dagestan	195,300	213,800	189,500	165,900	157,500	120,875	100,875
Checheno-Ingushetia	253,200	348,300	336,000	293,800		40,845	
Ingushetia						5,559	
North Osetia	156,100	178,700	200,700	189,200		164,734	
Stavropol' <i>Kray</i>	1,465,700	1,607,200	2,032,700	2,199,900		2,231,759	
Karachayevo Cherkessia	124,000	141,800	165,500	175,900		147,878	
Kabardino Balkaria	127,100	102,600	234,100	240,800		226,620	
Krasnodar <i>Kray</i>	2,748,800	3,363,700	4,159,100	4,300,500		4,436,272	
Adygeya	203,700	200,500	285,600	293,600		288,280	

Note: red indicates reduction, blue indicates gain.

Even when ethnic Russians and others leave for less violent areas of southern Russia they encounter new problems. Ethnic Russians who had lived in the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus moved not only to Stavropol' and Krasnodar *kraya* but also to Rostov *oblast'*, not too distant from their previous homes. However, they found their new areas somewhat 'foreign', for having lived amongst the indigenous mountain peoples for long periods of time they had absorbed their lifestyle and approach to life. In the new areas they were unable to

find common ground and language with the local Cossacks, in fact they were regarded as “*Chechens, Dagestanis, Circassians, anything except Russians*”.³⁸ The result is that these Russian migrants moved away once more.

Indigenous Muslim mountain people are also leaving their homes and moving to areas immediately bordering their ethnic republics in Stavropol', Krasnodar and the Kalmyk Republic. As Vatchagaev noted, Stavropol' is full of people from Dagestan and there are villages and settlements where they outnumber the ethnic Russian population. There has been a number of outbreaks of violence between Russians and Chechens, and a campaign in Krasnodar and Rostov to prevent registration by Chechens.³⁹

The trend of ethnic Russians leaving the Muslim republics in the North Caucasus also needs to be seen against the decline in the ethnic Russian birth-rate throughout the Russian Federation. Despite incentives, the birth rate for ethnic Russians remains resolutely low.⁴⁰

*...[O]ne of the few growth areas in Russia's population figures is in the number of Muslims. It should be stressed that these are native Russian citizens, not migrants from elsewhere but, given the campaign against international terrorism and the continuing war in Chechnya, the ever increasing number of Muslims may become a real internal security issue.*⁴¹

*“The real problem is the crisis of the Russian population, not the increase of the Muslim population...”*⁴²

Economic Effects

Bazhayev noted that President Vladimir Putin some four years ago remarked that the regional product of the North Caucasus republics was the lowest in the Federation, being some 3-8 times lower on average than the rest of the country. The subsidisation of the unemployed in the budget of the North Caucasus republics was more than 74%.⁴³

Table 2 – Unemployment in North Caucasus, February 2008⁴⁴

Republic	% Unemployment
Chechnya	46 -75%
Ingushetia	46%
Dagestan	20%
Kabardino-Balkaria	14%
Karachayevo-Cherkessia	14%
Stavropol' kray	7%
Kuban'	5.9%
Moscow	1%

Vladimir Putin had noted that “*the issue of Russians [leaving] signified the loss of a qualified work-force, with the absence of whole branches of production, cultural growth, and moreover the violation of the culture of peoples living together on these territories that had been achieved over centuries in the North Caucasus*”.⁴⁵

Bazhayev expounded on the industrial branches in which ethnic Russians had previously been employed:

... before the war the main mass of workers, a large part of the technical-engineering staff in the Chechen oil complex were Russians. The Groznyy oil institute at the end of the 1970s...was one of the leading professionally trained institutes in USSR. In the republic there were three huge oil refineries, two chemical plants and a gas converter

*plant. The Grozny industrial plant Krasny Molot was one of the leading producers of gas and drilling equipment, which even exported equipment abroad. Now all this is lost.*⁴⁶

In the republics it was also felt that as a result of the outflow of the Russian speaking population many employment opportunities in the national economy and in the social sphere had disappeared.⁴⁷

The shortage of specialists, especially in health and education, remains acute. Ruslan Khasbulatov in December 2000 had exposed the utter desolation and destruction in Grozny and also the damage to vital services in the republic at that time.⁴⁸ By July 2008 there was still a shortfall of more than 2,000 doctors and more than 500 teachers.⁴⁹ Grozny may have been rebuilt, but the reality of life is not quite so shiny.

Bazhayev believed that the regions by themselves had not the wherewithal to change the situation. The federal centre was subsidising the republics' budgets on average to the tune of 75%. In order that these billions of roubles could begin to work, but were not simply spent on day to day needs, he argued, it was necessary to adopt urgent measures for the creation of an effective economy in the region, which would also help the social sphere. He recalled that in 2007 there was an awareness of the absence of local directors and technical-engineer cadres possessing the necessary qualifications. Matters have hardly improved since.

Cossack Militancy

And yet at least one population group is determined to stay put. On 7 July 2009 the *atamany* (leaders) of the Terek Cossack council assembled in Vladikavkaz to discuss the idea of reconstituting a consolidated North Caucasus region which had previously existed in the form of Terek *oblast'* during the 19th century.⁵⁰ As Ataman Mikhail Inkavtsov recalled, the Terek *oblast'* in tsarist times was a very rich region.⁵¹ It was self-supporting and gave the treasury two million gold roubles.⁵² Then, the Bol'sheviks came to power and destroyed the *oblast'* which in turn led to other problems in the Caucasus. In Inkavtsov's view:

*At the present time all the subjects of the North Caucasus are subsidised. They are in a deep social-economic crisis, a clan system exists in government. If the situation doesn't change, the outflow of the Russian population will continue, since there is practically no chance of work. The creation of Terek oblast will decide political problems in the first place, lower territorial claims of certain peoples and will dissipate 'titular and non-titular nations'.*⁵³

Inkavtsov believed that whilst the question of 'titular and 'non-titular nations' had been introduced in Bol'shevik times, it had now assumed a far greater importance and was now one of the causes of ethnic nationalism in the region.⁵⁴ The actual arrival date of the Cossacks in the North Caucasus is part of the dispute. Assuming the arrival of the Greben and Terek Cossacks to the left bank of the River Terek was around the 16th/17th centuries, it is possible to appreciate the view held by present-day Cossacks, who consider themselves to be an indigenous people of the Caucasus, and their right to be there just as valid as those of other peoples. However, "*It is completely obvious that the famous 'Derbent Gate' on the western seaboard of the Caspian Sea, Dar'yal'skiy passage and a whole series of passes through the Caucasus Range have been actively used by local tribes since ancient times*".⁵⁵

Inkavtsov maintained that lawyers of the Terek Cossack Host were turning their attention to the State Duma, with a view to sending a formal proposal for Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya, Ingushetia, North Ossetia, Dagestan and part of Stavropol' *kray* to be included in a newer version of the former Terek *oblast'*. Adygeya and Karachayevo-Cherkessia would be included under the Kuban' Cossacks.⁵⁶ In the view of Magomet Barakhoyev, an Ingush activist, most of the small nations directly affected by this proposal would oppose it.⁵⁷

For some time now, certainly even before the two Russo-Chechen Wars in recent times and re-emphasised again from June 2003 onwards, Terek Cossacks, former defenders of

Russian territory have felt that their position was becoming increasingly tenuous due to declining numbers, loss of influence and complicated relationships with Chechen and Ingush alike.⁵⁸

Box 2 below summarises some of the Cossacks' long-standing aspirations and demands.

Box 2 – Terek Cossack Main Demands⁵⁹

- The 1957 transfer of Naurskiy and Shelkovskiy *rayony* reversed and the two *rayony* returned to Stavropol' *Kray*, which would also include Kargalinskiy on the Dagestan border.
- Former territory of Terek-Sunzha Cossacks in Chechnya, Ingushetia and North Osetia to revert to 1928 borders and transfer of enclave back to Stavropol' *Kray*.
- Creation of a Cossack autonomous republic under Stavropol' *Kray*.

Other Cossack demands for land transfers include:

- The pre-revolution Cossack *rayony* of Zelenchuksko-Urupskiy and Batapashinskiy in Karachayevo-Cherkessia;
- Cossack autonomy in Maikop rayon in Adygeya;
- Don-Cossack oblasts extending across Krasnodar and Stavropol' *Kraya*.
- Creation of a Kuban' Cossack Republic in Krasnodar *Kray*, including the entire territory of Adygeya with parts of Stavropol' and Karachayevo-Cherkessia.

There are longstanding claims by Cossacks to Naurskiy and Shelkovskiy *rayony*.

Box 3 – Naurskiy Rayon⁶⁰

On 23 January 1935 by order of the Supreme Soviet USSR Naurskiy *rayon* was formed as an independent administrative-territorial unit. The rayon has an ancient history: 230 years ago on the left bank of the Terek settlements with migrants from the Volga and the Don sprang up – the *stanitsy* of Naurskaya, Mekenskaya, Kalinovskaya, Ishcherskaya. In the 19th century a further group of populated points; Nikolayevskaya (1848), *stanitsa* Savel'levskaya (1886), farmsteads of Kapustin (1823), Krechetov (1855), Korneyevo (1866), Selivankin in 1888, farmsteads of Postniy in 1870 and Klinkov in 1892. The land area in Naurskiy *rayon* is 2205 sq km. 2045 sq km is under agricultural use with 3.9 sq km occupied by industry. The territory borders Shelkovskiy *rayon* which lies to the east, to the north and east are Stavropol' *Kray* and the Republic of Dagestan, Groznenskiy and Nadterechnyy *rayony*. The *rayon* centre is Naurskaya. The *rayon* is divided into two zones: the steppe (the dry steppe) and the Terek steppe. Due to climatic conditions the northern part of the *rayon* is suitable for livestock farming, the south and south-eastern areas for livestock farming, arable and viticulture. There is potential for future development in agriculture.

Box 4 – Shelkovskiy Rayon⁶¹

Shelkovskiy *rayon* was formed in 1923 and is situated in the north of the republic. The *rayon* along the Terek borders Groznenskiy, Gudermesskiy and Naurskiy rayony of the Chechen Republic, and with Khasavyurtovskiy, Babayurtovskiy, Kizlyarskiy, Tarumovskiy and Nogayskiy rayony of Dagestan. The administrative centre is Shelkovskaya with a population of 9,200. Shelkovskaya is in the south-east 70 km from Groznyy. The rural population live in 25 populated points. As at 1 January 2001 (preliminary data), the population together with displaced persons amounted to 52,700. Populated points are in the south and east along the Terek and main transport routes. The *rayon* has a high density of railway routes: Astrakhan – Kizlyar – Chervlenno-Uzlovaya - 24 km. The length of the road network is 233.6 km. All roads are metalled. The main autoroute (republic standard) is Stavropol' – Prokhladnyy – Mozdok – Kizlyar – Kraynovka (115.6 km). The road is in direct proximity to the railway at Chervlenno-Uzlovaya, providing an opportunity to transfer goods from rail to road. The total area is 299,400 hectares including 39,400 hectares of arable land; length from south to north is 50 km and from west to east 96 km. It is the largest *rayon* in Chechnya. Oil and building materials are found in the *rayon*. The *rayon* is characterised by a low level of woodland.

Trend 3 – Regional Reorganisation

Whether the Cossack claims will be acted upon remains moot. There have, however, been persistent airings of possible plans by the Kremlin to combine small administrative-territorial entities in the North Caucasus. These raise concerns about the survival of ethno-national communities on which the administrative-territorial entities were specifically based. Barakhoyev⁶² argued that amalgamation would cause the extinction of these small regions and lead to their complete 'Russification' which many both regionally and in Moscow had been resisting.

The creation of a major oblast' could possibly take place under the aegis of reforms proposed by Dmitriy Kozak some four years ago. Its aim was to abolish the small administrative-territorial entities such as Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachayevo-Cherkessia: an act tantamount to removing their political independence. The subsequent reduction of subsidies from the Centre would weaken the power of local elites and consequently reduce the scale of corruption. An additional side-effect of the reforms would be a decrease in the number of civil servants in the YuFO required to administer the budget.⁶³

*Ultimately Russia would only have six or seven super-regions and one of them would be the "Cossack Kray" based on Rostov-on-Don. The inclusion of Adygeya into Krasnodar Kray was a test of this strategy, and after that, Moscow will create a Cossack region, which in the words of Dmitriy Kozak would be charged with putting the non-Russian regions of the North Caucasus "in order".*⁶⁴

Barakhoyev's view was that it would be nothing short of a disaster, with the liquidation of the non-Russian republics or their combination into multi-ethnic ones as an initial step towards a Cossack *Kray*: languages would lose their former status, people would lose their ethnic identity, customs and links with the past.⁶⁵

Historically, one must remember that the Ingush, being a numerically small people, throughout the time of Terek oblast' in the 19th century, and for most of the 20th century, were always included with another people, such as the Ossetians and later the Chechens. Until their separation from the Chechens at the beginning of the 1990s, they had never enjoyed the privilege of having their own capital city.⁶⁶

It is an open question of course, with or without wholesale reorganisation, how the removal of a 'titular nations' concept and the share of government posts based on population size would be received in a republic such as Dagestan with 32 titular nationalities.

Table 3 – Dagestan Population Figures

Ethnicity	1989 Census ⁶⁷	1998 (est) ⁶⁸	2002 Census	2005 (est)
Dagestan Total	1,808,200	2,167,100	2,576,531	?
Avars	496,100(27.4%)	630,000 (29.1%)	758,438 (29.4%)	
Dargins	280,400 (15.5%)	357,000 (16.5%)	425,526 (16.5%)	
Kumyks	231,800 (12.8%)	273,000 (12.6%)	365,804 (14.2%)	
Lezgins	204,400 (11.3%)	252,000 (11.6%)	336,698 (13.1%)	
Laks	91,700 (5.1%)	105,000 (4.8%)	139,732 (5.4%)	
Tabarsaran	78,200 (4.3%)	105,000 (4.8%)	110,162 (4.3%)	
Nogay	28,300 (1.6%)	42,000 (1.9%)	38,168 (1.5%)	
Rutuls	15,000 (0.8%)		24,298 (0.9%)	
Aguls	13,800 (0.8%)	63,000 ⁶⁹ (2.9%)	23,314 (0.9%)	
Tsakhurs	5,200 (0.3%)		8,168 (0.3%)	
Russians	165,900 (9.2%)	157,500 (7.3%)	120,875 (4.7%)	100,875 ⁷⁰ (3.9%)?
Azerbaijanis	75,000 (4.2%)	93,578 (4.3%)	111,656 (4.3%)	
Jews	9,400 (0.5%)		1,478 (0.1%)	
Mountain Jews			1,066 (0.04%)	
Chechens	57,900 (0.3%)	73,000	87,867 (3.4%)	
Ukrainians			2,869 (0.1%)	
Armenians			6,702 (0.3%)	
Tatars			4,659 (0.2%)	
Tats	12,900 (0.7%)		825 (0.3%)	

Table 4 below illustrates the ethnic diversity in Dagestan and emphasises the necessity of proportionality in government related to 'titular' nationality share in the overall population.

Table 4 – Titular Nationalities in Administrative Structure of Dagestan⁷¹

Ethnicity	Government Senior Posts	Share in Senior Posts (%)	Parliament Share (%)	Population Share (%)
Avar	11	28.21	28.93	29.4
Dargin	8	20.51	17.36	16.5
Kumyk	7	17.95	13.22	14.2
Lezgin	4	10.26	11.57	13.1
Lak	3	7.69	4.96	5.4
Russian	2	5.13	7.44	4.7
Azeri	1	2.56	4.13	4.3
Tabasaran	2	2.56	4.13	4.3
Chechen	1	2.56	3.31	3.4
Nogay	0	0.00	1.65	1.5
Rutul	0	0.00	0.83	0.9
Agul	1	2.56	0.83	0.9
Tsakhir	0	0.00	0.83	0.3
Tat	0	0.00	0.83	0.03

There is one additional factor which will add impetus to Trend One – The Cycle of Violence, namely the economic downturn in Russia.

Russian Economic Downturn

According to Valery Dzutsev in an article written on 16 September 2009 in the *“Eurasia Daily Monitor”*,⁷² Dmitry Kozak, the environment minister announced on 11 September that Moscow would have to divert some of the subsidy money originally destined for the North Caucasus republics to other Russian regions. Clearly this has pan-Russian Federation implications. It had been understood for a long time that the loyalty of elites in the North Caucasus republics depended on subsidies from the Centre. According to Dzutsev, due to political volatility and separatist movements in the region an unending supply of finance *“was almost guaranteed despite the fact that Russia was badly hit by the worldwide economic crunch”*.⁷³

Dzutsev, warned that whilst Moscow might not have enough money to subsidise its flawed policies in the North Caucasus it might be forced to change its policies towards reform and change its approach towards the *“growing problems of the region”*,⁷⁴ but this was by no means certain due to the rigidity of the present political system. There was the possibility that Moscow could simply revert to brute force and even instigate inter-ethnic conflict to keep political movements in disarray. Dzutsev, completed his article by saying that *“Unless Moscow opted for radical political reforms, the violence in the North Caucasus is likely to increase even further as a result of shrinking resources”*.⁷⁵

Conclusions

The proposed shortfalls in financial aid in the form of subsidies from the Centre to republican elites in the North Caucasus could become the catalyst which increases the cycle of violence in the North Caucasus.

A widened cycle of violence will also affect the South Caucasus. Already, there have been movements of people from the North to the South, from Dagestan to Eastern Georgia: it is not significant at the moment, but could become a major problem. The exodus of Chechens during the Second Russo-Chechen War to the Pankisi Gorge in Eastern Georgia should not be forgotten.

Violence and instability emanating from the North on such a wide scale would be harmful to Western interests in Georgia and Azerbaijan.

Reduced scale of subsidies in the North when seen against the vast sums of money being spent in Sochi in the West North Caucasus in preparation for the 2014 Winter Olympics and Moscow’s financial assistance to South Ossetia and Abkhazia could well become additional sources of major discontent which might even threaten the holding of the Games at Sochi.

There is a need to provide massive investment not only in the infrastructure but in people, particularly in the education and training of young people together with worthwhile employment opportunities in the turbulent northeast Caucasus: Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia.

Furthermore, the power structures themselves must be accountable under the law, and be seen to be so. The Chechen president’s personal control of the local law enforcement organs can obviously be open to abuse. Clearly, amongst all the republics’ law enforcement organs and agencies, Dagestan included, there is a need for additional training and selection of members.

The concept of super-administrative-territorial regions could well be the way forward on economic grounds, but the concept has the potential to negatively impact upon political and social cohesion in an inherently complex region.

As Malashenko noted, *“it’s not possible to solve the problems of the North Caucasus in one hour”*.

Endnotes

- ¹ http://nvo.ng.ru/reality/2009-07-10/1_boyeviki.html *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 10 July 2009, "Bandpodpolnye kontratakuyet" by Viktor Myasnikov.
- ² C W Blandy *The Caspian: Commnatory Crosscurrents* S40 CSRC January 1999, p14, quoting Eduard Ozhiganov from *NG – Religii* No 6, 17 June 1998 pp 12/13 "Faktoy destabilizatsii religioznogo-politicheskoy situatsii v Dagestane" by Maksim Shevchenko and Aleksey Malashenko.
- ³ Moskovskiy Tsentr Karnegi, briefing, Tom 11, Vypusk 3, August 2009, *Kavkaz, kotoryy my teryayem* by Aleksey Malashenko.
- ⁴ Ibid p 1.
- ⁵ Ibid p 2.
- ⁶ Ibid p 2.
- ⁷ Ibid p 2. See also C W Blandy *Chechnya: Continued Violence* CSRC, Caucasus Series 06/54 pp 9-11.
- ⁸ Ibid p 2. See also C W Blandy "Chechnya: Continued Violence" CSRC, Caucasus Series 06/54 pp 9-11. Shamil' Basayev was killed on 10 July 2006 in the village of Ekazhevo, Ingushetia.
- ⁹ Ibid p2.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.
- ¹¹ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1204417> *Kommersant* No 127, 16 July 2009 "Pokhishcheniye na kazn" by Musa b-Muradov.
- ¹² <http://lenta.ru/news/2009/08/11/activist/> *Lenta.ru* 11 August 2009, "Kavkaz, Prestupnost' v Rossii".
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- ¹⁴ Op cit http://nvo.ng.ru/reality/2009-07-10/1_boyeviki.html
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/158053> *Kavkazskiy Uzel* 17 August 2009 "V Ingushetii v rezul'tate terakta v Nazrani pogibli 14 chelovek, 56 raneny" by Dmitriy Florin.
- ¹⁷ Malashenko Op cit.
- ¹⁸ Op cit http://nvo.ng.ru/reality/2009-07-10/1_boyeviki.html
- ¹⁹ Jamestown Foundation, *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Vol 1, Iss 142, 8 December 2004. "Chechnya: Land of a Thousand Safe Houses" by Charles Gurin. "On December 7, *Izvestiya* published a second article by its special correspondent in Chechnya, Vadim Rechkalov addressing the issue of why Russia's special services have been unable to catch rebel warlord Shamil Basaev. A Russian counter-intelligence officer estimated that 'up to 30% of the staff of the Chechen Interior Ministry' are rebel accomplices and that some of these sell rebel fighters internal passports, fictitious names, and other forged identification documents."
- ²⁰ It is also interesting to note that it is not always young men that join the *boyeviki* in the mountains: "There is information that 20 young women aged between 15 to 20 have gone into the forests in Chechnya... the outflow is continuing. We know who they are." <http://zavtra.ru/cgi/veil//data/zavtra/08/771/33.html> *Zavtra* No 35, 27 August 2008 "Sulim Yamadayev 'Khoroshiy boy yeshche budet...' by Yuriy Kotenok.
- ²¹ http://nvo.ng.ru/reality/2009-07-10/1_boyeviki.html *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* 10 July 2009.
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Ibid.
- ²⁴ <http://www.mk.ru/numbers/1682/article55887.htm>, *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 16 June 2005, "Prodayem Kavkaz" by Aleksandr Khinshteyn. See also Blandy *North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching Destabilisation* CSRC, Caucasus Series 05/36, August 2005, p1.
- ²⁵ Malashenko op cit.
- ²⁶ <http://www.newizv.ru/news/2008-07-28/94729> *Novyye Izvestiya*, 28 July 2008. "Prezident Assotsiatsii chechenskikh obshchestvennykh i kul'turnykh ob'yedinyenyi Mavlit Bazhayev: 'V odinochku respubliki Severnogo Kavkaza s problemami ne spravyatsya'" by Vladlen Maksimov.
- ²⁷ Ibid p2.
- ²⁸ V. Kabuzan, *Naseleniye Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX-XX Vekakh* Table 72, p214. Kabuzan's figures for the total population for the 1989 Census were 1,270,400.
- ²⁹ <http://www.newizv.ru/news/2008-07-28/94729> *Novyye Izvestiya*, 28 July 2008.
- ³⁰ Ibid.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² But note Census 2002 figures in Table 1.
- ³³ Ibid.
- ³⁴ 1939-1989 data from V. M. Kabuzan *Naseleniye Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX – XX vekakh*, Izdatel'stvo Russko-Baltiyskiy informatsionniy tesntr BLITS, St Petersburg, 1996, extracted from Tables 68, 69, 70 and 71, pp 209-12.

³⁵ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 72, 23 April 1998 "Dagestan stal politicheskim poligonom Rossii" by Magomed-Zarid Varisov, Director of the Information-Analytical Department of the Peoples Assembly of Dagestan.

³⁶ Rossiyskaya Federatsiya Federal'naya Sluzhba Gosudarstvenoy Statistiki, *Svodnyye Itogi Vserossiyskoy Perepisi Naseleniya 2002*, Vol 14, Moskva, Statistika Rossii, 2005.

³⁷ <http://www.mk.ru/numbers/1682/article55887.htm> *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 16 June 2005.

³⁸ http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ncw/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4339&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=189&no_cache=1 *North Caucasus Analysis* Vol 8 Iss 30, 27 July 2007 "The Continuing Exodus of Ethnic Russians from the Caucasus" by Mairbek Vatchagaev.

³⁹ Ibid p2.

⁴⁰ Keir Giles, "Where have all the Soliders Gone? Russia's Military Plans versus Demographic Reality" CSRC, Russian Series 06/47, October 2006.

⁴¹ Dr Steven J Main *Russia's Golden Bridge is Crumbling: Demographic Crisis in the Russian Federation*, CSRC, Russian Series 06/39, August 2006, p14.

⁴² Aleksey Malashenko quoted in Ibid p14.

⁴³ <http://www.newizv.ru/news/2008-07-28/94729> *Novyye Izvestiya*, 28 July 2008.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Following a fact finding mission to the Chechen Republic at the end of November 2000, Ruslan Khasbulatov wrote a report about the state of affairs in the region and forwarded it to the government of the Russian Federation. See C W Blandy *Chechnya: Federal Retribution "Encirclement, Forceful Intervention & Isolation* P34, CSRC, March 2001. The report was published by *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on 29 December 2000 as "Situatsiya v Chechenskoy Respublike". Not unexpectedly the report made devastating reading. "The Chechen Republic as a unified social-economic organism does not exist any more. Industrial, commerce, sustenance and any other form of connection between populated points which operated over centuries has either disappeared completely, or exists in a rudimentary form, occasionally breaking through the powerful 'blockers'. The population of the republic is in a state of god-forsaken isolation from the outside world. Isolation is the most successful part of the counter-terrorist operation being carried out, which in fact has been transformed into a war against all the peaceful population of the republic. It is a fact, it is reality. From the point of view of security, the availability or presence of conditions to support life (food, water, medical aid), the possibility of movement, access to information etc. Unemployment has reached more than 80% of the population capable of work. No form of the economy exists, conditions are not being created for the revival of primary, handmade forms of management in the village, people have utterly lost the opportunity of working for a living. The actions implemented for the recreation of a system of education and medical care are far from adequate for the scale of the tasks, and the workers occupied in them are in no position to fulfil their responsibilities. Schools, higher education establishments, hospitals in fact are not ready (although official sources maintain the opposite) for normal operation. In the republic all types and forms of disease are raging, to the extent it is patently obvious that absolutely the whole population is in need of medico-psychological treatment on an in-patient basis. To experience two dreadful wars, and in the three year period between them the conditions of a concentration camp of the Maskhadov regime ... all that remains are deep psychological deterioration and trauma. This problem is hushed up."

⁴⁹ <http://www.newizv.ru/news/2008-07-28/94729> *Novyye Izvestiya*, 28 July 2008.

⁵⁰ <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/156573> *Kavkazskiy Uzel* 14 August 2009 "Terskiye Kazaki khotyat vossozdat' Terskuyu oblast'" by Luiza Orazayeva.

⁵¹ By 1845 new *stanitsy* were being built in areas which afforded access to the most fertile soil but which entailed driving out complete populations from their traditional sites. The position deteriorated further for the indigenous peoples as their resistance became weaker. Tsarism had an open policy of advancing on land belonging to the mountain peoples. Tsarist objectives were achieved by two methods of operation: "The first decisive method – the resettlement of all Chechens, even by force of arms, if it appeared necessary to the left bank of the Terek or Sunzha, with the subsequent establishment on the vacated land by *stanitsy* of the 1st and 2nd Sunzhenskiy Cossack Regiments; the second – peaceful, but slower – a constant weakening of the Chechen population by 'volunteers' with their resettlement from the mountains to the plain and encouragement of resettlement in Turkey." Points made by A. I. Khasbulatov "Agrarnyy vopros v politike tsarizma v Checheno-Ingushetii vo II pol - nach v XX", p7, in "*Checheno-Ingushetiya v Politicheskoy istorii Rossi i Kavkaza v dorevolyutsionnom proshlom*" Ed. A I Khasbulatov, Sh B Akhmadov, Ya Z Akhmadov, A I Mamkiyev, V E Naumenko, Chechno-Ingushskiy nauchno-Issledovatel'skiy institute istorii, ekonomiki, sotsilogii i filologii.

- ⁵² <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/156573> *Kavkazskiy Uzel* 14 August 2009.
- ⁵³ Op cit.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid.
- ⁵⁵ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 23 April 2003 p15 "Tochka kontakta tsivilizatsiy uzhe v bonzovom veke narody Severnogo Kavkaza obschchalis' s nositelyami indoyevropeyskikh yazykov" by Sergey Korenevskiy.
- ⁵⁶ <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/156573> *Kavkazskiy Uzel* 14 August 2009.
- ⁵⁷ <http://www.ingushetia.ru/news/14036.html> "Novosti Respubliki Ingushetiya: Pochemu Ukraina i Gruziiya stremyatsiya v NATO?" by Magomet Barakhoyev, 23 April 2008, which included comments on an earlier article by Ruslan Gorevoy in *Versiya* No 12 "Plodites i ukрупnyates", devoted to the merging of Russian Federation regions. See also <http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:Dxd8153hCF8J:georgiandaily.com/index.php> *Georgian Daily* 14 July 2009, "Cossacks Want a Russian North Caucasus in Place of 'Bankrupt' Republics", by Paul Goble.
- ⁵⁸ http://www.ng.ru/regions/2003-06-02/14_bondarev.html *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 108, 2 June 2003 "Do kazakov nikomu do sikh por net dela" by Mariya Bondarenko.
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- ⁶⁰ <http://www.chechnya.gov.ru/republic/map/17.html> Pravitel'stvo Chechenskoj Respubliki.
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- ⁶² <http://www.ingushetia.ru/news/14036.html> "Novosti Respubliki Ingushetiya: Pochemu Ukraina i Gruziiya stremyatsiya v NATO?" by Magomet Barakhoyev, 23 April 2008.
- ⁶³ <http://www.mk.ru/numbers/1682/article55887.htm>, *Moskovskiy Komsomolets*, 16 June 2005, "Prodayem Kavkaz" by Aleksandr Khinshteyn. See also Blandy *North Caucasus: On the Brink of Far-Reaching Destabilisation* CSRC, Caucasus Series 05/36, page 1, August 2005.
- ⁶⁴ Ibid.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶⁶ C W Blandy *Whither Ingushetia*, CSRC, Caucasus Series, 06/03, January 2006, page 4.
- ⁶⁷ 1989 and 1998 data from V M Kabuzan *Naseleniye Severnogo Kavkaza v XIX – XX vekakh*, extracted from Tables 68, 69, 70 and 71, pp209-12.
- ⁶⁸ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* No 72, 23 April 1998 page 5 "*Dagestan stal politicheskim poligonom Rossii*" by Magomed-Zarid Varisov - Director of the Information-Analytical Department of the Peoples Assembly of Dagestan.
- ⁶⁹ Combined total of Rutuls, Aguls, Tsakhurs and Tats.
- ⁷⁰ <http://www.mk.ru/numbers/1682/article55887.htm>
- ⁷¹ <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docId=651675> *Kommersant* No 31, 21 February 2006 page 6 "Ne synom yedinyim Ol'ga b-Allenova.
- ⁷² http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ncw/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35497&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=24&cHash=218d688bbc *Eurasia Daily Monitor* Volume: 6 Issue: 169, 16 September 2009 "*Moscow Reduces Aid to the North Caucasus: Jeopardising the Precarious Security Environment*" by Valery Dzutsev.
- ⁷³ Ibid page 1
- ⁷⁴ Ibid page 1
- ⁷⁵ Ibid page 1

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